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This article examines offshore outsourcing of legal and law-related
services as the newest twist in the international market for legal services. We
consider the impact of offshore outsourcing on the profession generally and
analyze the ethical issues raised by offshore outsourcing, both as it exists today
and as the practice may develop in the future. The article begins by situating
offshore outsourcing in the framework of relationships created in the context of
delivery of legal services. This framework is used, in turn, to construct a structure
of analysis for the ethical implications of offshore outsourcing. Lawyers who
outsource to offshore providers must conduct an investigation to ensure that the
referral is appropriate. We also consider the potential reputation and economic
benefits and disadvantages to law firms and legal departments in outsourcing
offshore. We find that offshore outsourcing creates new opportunities for nonU.S. lawyers without putting them on equal footing with lawyers trained and
licensed in the U.S. Instead, as with many aspects of globalization, offshore
outsourcing emphasizes the divisions already present in the legal profession.
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Globalization recently has been described by Thomas Friedman as
“flattening” the world through a combination of technology and “geoeconomics,”
resulting in a shift in the way work is accomplished and enabling new
collaboration and competition.
Technology enables the proliferation of
information, and facilitates the division and distribution of tasks to those able to
most efficiently accomplish them regardless of their location. As a result,
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individuals and organizations from less developed nations such as India and
China are able to participate in highly sophisticated work without leaving their
home countries, while previously they would have had to relocate for the same
opportunities.2
This article addresses the impact of this aspect of globalization on the
world of legal and law-related services. We ask whether the market for these
services is “flattened” by globalization in the same ways described by Friedman.
Our focus here is on offshore outsourcing, which is possible when services are
divided into discrete tasks that are delegated to less-costly service providers
located far from the outsourcer. A business outsources by segmenting off an
aspect of its activities and retaining a third party to perform the activities. 3
Offshoring, on the other hand, occurs when a business relocates its activities to a
location that allows the business to capture some efficiency, often through lower
labor costs.4 The developments that drive globalization, including advances in
transportation and technology, also support outsourcing offshore. Examples are
ubiquitous, and include relocation of customer call centers, data processing
activities, medical transcription services,5 software design activities,6 accounting
services7 and even interpretation of x-rays.8 One estimate is that “as many as [3.3
2

Thomas L. Friedman, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2005).
3
See, e.g., 8 Executive Agenda: Ideas and Insights for Business Leaders 50 (No. 3 AT
Kearney
2004),
available
at
http://www.atkearney.com/shared_res/pdf/EA73_RealOffshoring_S.pdf (“We define outsourcing
as when a company assigns its activities, and sometimes its people, to a third party.”).
4
See id. (“Our definition of offshoring is the search for a lower cost location for business
processing.”). Of course, there are other uses for offshore outsourcing, as well as business
purposes. See, e.g., Michael Braga, Wary of change, Sarasota Herald-Trib. (Florida), Jan. 16,
2005, at D1 (describing outsourcing in the 1990s being fueled by “U.S. software firms … hunting
for programmers to help them deal with the much-hyped Y2K computer bug.”); Jane Mayer,
Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106 (discussing the U.S.
government’s outsourcing of interrogation and torture).
5
For a description of medical transcription, see Medical Transcription A to Z, available at
http://www.medtranscription.com/info.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
6
See
Posting
of Todd Ogasawara
to
O’Reilly Developer
Weblogs,
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/wlg/4126 (Jan. 4, 2004, 21:36 EST) (referring to a survey by
Software Development Magazine that reported more than 50% of design projects being outsourced
offshore).
7
See Tom Herman, Tax Report: Ethics Rule May Help Taxpayers Learn if Firms
Outsource Returns, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2005, at D2; Kris Maher, Next on the Outsourcing List,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2004 (listing medical, animation, insurance, digitizing, desktop publishing,
telemarketing and financial jobs as being outsourced; accounting, bookkeeping and tax preparation
work are included in the “financial” category of outsourced jobs). But see Braga, supra note 4
(reporting on resistance of Southwest Florida accountants to outsource preparation of tax returns
to India: “‘[W]e decided not to do it [outsource their 10-40 work offshore] because we didn’t feel
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million] white-collar jobs could be shipped abroad … by 2015.”9
Law practice tends to follow business, whether we focus on international
expansion, diversity of the workforce or the acceptance of more casual standards
of business attire. Outsourcing is no exception. Law firms have outsourced their
libraries10 and certain support services, such as data processing and copying,11 for
some time. Today, certain law firms outsource significant portions of their backoffice support services.12 One foreign offshore firm offers law firms the option of
outsourcing ten categories of activities, including financial and accounting
services, presentation preparation services, and litigation support services.13 The
outsourced work might be accomplished in a lower-cost area of the United States
(which is sometimes called “homeshoring “ or “farmshoring” 14 ) or in another
country, in either case taking advantage of lower labor and overhead costs.
Attention recently has shifted from outsourcing back-office, administrative
and support functions for law firms and legal departments to outsourcing legal
and law-related services themselves. 15 In this shift, the uniqueness of law,
it was what our clients would want.’ … ‘It came down to a quality control issue and whether we
would be ashamed to tell our clients.’”).
8
See Susan Bliss, Should DUR be outsourced offshore to cut costs?, Drug Topics, Dec. 13,
2004, available at http://www.drugtopics.com/drugtopics/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=137451
(“For at least two years, many U.S. hospitals have been beaming digital X-rays to radiologists in
Australia and India for interpretation. “Nighthawk” services (so called because they work during
our nighttime hours) are staffed by U.S. licensed doctors or Indian M.D.s who communicate with
U.S. physicians.”).
9
Braga, supra note 4. See also Leigh Jones, The 24-hour firm: a ‘No Sleep Zone?,’
NAT’L L. J., Nov. 14, 2005 (suggesting that “[i]n 2004, an estimated 12,000 legal jobs, including
those in research and document production and preparation, were sent offshore”) (citing U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics and Forrester Research).
10
Sherrie F. Nachman, Baker & McKenzie to Librarians: Check Out, AM. LAW., May 1995,
at 14.
11
Nathan Koppel, How Bad Is It, AM. LAW., Feb. 2002, at 74.
12
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe’s outsourcing center is described in Amy Kolz, Wheeling,
We Have a New Client, AM. LAW TECH., Sept. 2004, at S27.
13
Office Tiger, http://www.officetiger.com/whatwedo/legal_mar.htm (last visited Feb. 13,
2004).
14
Inside vs. Outside: When Does it Make Sense for Law Firms to Outsource, Roundtable
PRACTICE
TODAY
(April
2006),
available
at
Discussion,
LAW
http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/mgt04063.shtml (last visited July 10, 2006).
15
Domestic outsourcing by U.S. and UK firms is more common, but outside the scope of
this article. U.S. domestic outsourcing firms include Axiom Legal Solutions, Inc., Outside GC
and CorpLaw Associates. Heather Smith, Temps with a Twist, CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 2004) at 28.
See also Anthony Lin, Legal Outsourcing Looks to the Heartland, N.Y. L.J. (June 16, 2004)
(outsourcing of office staff to Fargo, N.D., for Piper Rudnick). On the practices of English MagicCircle firms to outsource to smaller English law firms, see Paul Hodkinson, Freshfields in lowmargin property outsourcing push, LEGAL WEEK (Jan. 4, 2004); Press Release, Lovells, Lovells
wins Client Care Award for “Mexican-Wave,” (July 3, 2003), available at
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compared to business and even to other professional services such as accounting,
is crystallized. Outsourcing legal services raises special concerns that implicate
the professional obligations of lawyers and our self-regulatory regime. The
ethical and regulatory issues are complicated by the outsourced activities being
sent offshore to jurisdictions where regulatory restrictions and judicial systems
differ from those in the United States and consequently issues of unauthorized
practice and enforceability of contracts may be relevant. 16 Of course, these
ethical and regulatory concerns are only part of the story, for outsourcing legal
services implicates the judgment lawyers bring to their clients. In this regard,
outsourcing legal services is similar to the issues raised any service involving
judgment, nuance and experience.
In this article, we place offshore outsourcing of legal and law-related
services in the larger context of globalization as it impacts the legal profession
generally, and consider the ethical issues raised by offshore outsourcing, both as it
exists today and as the practice may develop in the future. We begin in Part I
with an examination of the existing offshore outsourcing activities of lawyers, law
firms and corporate legal departments, in order to separate the hype surrounding
outsourcing from reality. We then consider the motives for outsourcing, both for
outsourcers and those receiving the assignments (frequently referred to as
“vendors” or “providers”). In order to understand how the outsourcing
relationship differs from typical lawyer-client and lawyer-lawyer relationships, in
Part II we construct an analytical framework based on traditional relationships
among lawyers and between lawyers and their clients to consider the ethical
issues raised by offshore outsourcing. We look to professional regulation for
guidance on the ethical issues raised by offshore outsourcing in the context of a
law firm outsourcing to an offshore service provider. Finally, in Part III we
consider the potential benefits and disadvantages to law firms and legal
departments in outsourcing offshore.
I: Contextualizing Offshore Outsourcing Through the Lens of Globalization
Offshore outsourcing is headline news for businesses, and legal services
are following here as elsewhere. 17 Reports of offshore outsourcing of legal
services are announced with attention-grabbing proclamations such as “Corporate
America Sending More Legal Work to Bombay,”18 “A Passage to India,”19 “New
http://www.lovells.com/PressReleaseDetailServlet?id=198 (last visited Feb. 19, 2005) (describing
Lovells practice of referring routine legal services to “provincially-based solicitors”).
16
On the legal system of India in the conext of outsourcing legal services, see Jayanth K.
Krishan, Outsourcing and the Globalizing Legal Profession, WILLIAM & MARY L. REV.
(forthcoming), available at www.ssrn.com.
17
In fact, an average of three news articles on offshore outsourcing of legal services has
been published each month since March 2004.
18
Ellen L. Rosen, Corporate America Sending More Legal Work to Bombay, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2004, § 10, at 1.
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Jersey law firms to outsource from India,”20 and “More U.S. Legal Work Moves
to India’s Low-Cost Lawyers”.21 Despite the warnings implicit in these banners,
however, most of the reports tell of offshore outsourcing of back-office and
support services for lawyers rather than of legal advisory services.22 Back-office
work is substantial in terms of dollars involved: one estimate is that the “top 200
[U.S.-based] law firms spend more than $20 billion a year for back-office
work.”23 Law firms are accomplishing the outsourcing of back-office work both
directly and through the use of intermediary outsourcing firms to outsourcers
situated in the United States and abroad.24
In addition to administrative back-office work, services commonly
performed by paralegals and new law graduates are being outsourced, including
preparation of patent applications and document review. Outsourcing of these
sorts of activities illustrates how services can be disaggregated for purposes of
capitalizing on the efficiencies from sending work to lower cost service providers
situated overseas. 25 Discrete tasks are outsourced to individuals, who may be
19

Rich Smith, A Passage to India, The Motley Fool, Jan. 26, 2004, available at
http://www.fool.com/news/commentary/2004/commentary040126rs.htm.
20
New Jersey law firms to outsource from India, IndiaExpress Bureau, Mar. 24, 2004,
available at http://www.indiaexpress.com/news/business/20040324-0.html. See also, New Jersey
firms outsourcing their legal work to India, Outsourcing.org, Mar. 24, 2004, available at
www.outsourcing.org.
21
Eric Bellman & Nathan Koppel, More U.S. Legal Work Moves to India’s Low-Cost
Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2005, at B1.
22
The comments of Kirkland &Ellis partner, Gregg Kirchhoefer, are apropos: “[I]t could
be 50 years before lawyers in India do more than “routine, prosaic” American legal work. . . .
‘Firms like ours that work on complicated and significant cases don't expect the main part of that
work effort to be done [offshore] at the same level we do it,’ he says.” Id.
One prediction is that by the year 2025, “[o]utsourcing and offshoring of legal work will
be the norm … ‘Research may be done in India, transcript summaries may be done in the
Philippines, and document preparation will be done in Mexico.” Trends, Partner’s Report for Law
Firm Owners (Feb. 2005). But see Associate Management, Partner’s Report for Law Firm Owners,
(Nov. 2004) (“One government study suggests that 8% of the lawyer jobs in the U.S. will be
outsourced over the next five years” according to Ward Bower of Altman Weil, Inc.); Jennifer
Fried, U.S. Legal Jobs Being Shipped Overseas, WESTERN MASS L. TRIB., Oct. 17, 2004, at 1
(“Forrester Research, Inc., a Cambridge, Mass-based market research firm, predicts that more than
489,000 U.S. lawyer jobs, nearly 8% of the filed, will shift abroad by 2015.”). Forrester estimated
that 12,000 legal jobs moved offshore in 2004. Krystan Crawford, Outsourcing and the Lawyers,
CNN MONEY, Oct. 15, 2004.
23
Tommy Fernandez, Low costs make the case for outsourcing legal work, CRAINS N.Y.
BUS., Sept. 13, 2004, at 21.
24
See http://www.hildebrandt.com/Documents.aspx?Doc_ID=1802 (describing the joint
venture between Hildebrandt and OfficeTiger); Leigh Jones, supra note 9 (describing Orrick
Herrington & Sutcliffe’s domestic outsourcing activities).
25
See Beaverstock, Managing Across Border: Knowledge Management and Expatriation
in Professional Service Legal Firms, 4 J. ECON. GEOG. 157, at 157 (2004) (“Processes of
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licensed lawyers or experts in other fields, such as engineering, working in remote
locations, including India. Once the outsourced work is completed it is integrated
into the larger context of the client project, and this integration typically occurs in
the United States. One of the earliest examples of offshore outsourcing by a law
firm is the Bickel & Brewer law firm of Dallas, which opened a back-office
support facility in India in 1995 in which it uses lawyers and non-lawyers to “scan,
code, index and abstract documents”26 to support its Texas litigation practice.
Analyzing outsourcing by examining the functions being outsourced leads
to the dilemma of separating legal from law-related and non-legal services. When
legal services are outsourced the same ethical rules regulating lawyers’ activities
generally apply, resulting in outsourcing raising concerns about unauthorized
practice and other ethical issues. Law-related services, in contrast, raise a
relatively limited set of ethical issues. Back office, support and paralegal services,
on the other hand, are appropriate for non-lawyers and generate application of the
ethical rules in the larger context in which the services are integrated. The
distinction among legal, law-related and non-legal services implicates the
boundaries of the practice of law, which leads us to the circuitous definition that
“the ‘practice of law’ is the rendering of professional services to a person who
believes that he or she is a client dealing with a lawyer.”27 Unfortunately, this
raises at least as many questions as it might resolve, since there is no general
agreement on the definition of “the practice of law” and the activities currently
being outsourced skate close to the divide between “legal” and “support” services.
Examples of the type of work outsourced offshore include “patent applications
and litigation support,”28 “legal research and pieces of M & A transaction[s],”29
and even drafting pretrial motions and briefs.30 Each of these activities might be
economic globalization have continued to splinter the productive activities of transnational
corporations . . .”).
26
Helen Coster, Briefed in Bangalore, AM. LAW., Nov. 2004.
27
See, e.g., Robert R. Keatinge, Multidimensional Practice in a World of Invincible
Ignorance: MDP, MJP, and Ancillary Business after Enron, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 723 (2002) (“A
starting point is to recognize that the most workable definition of the “practice of law” is the
rendering of professional services to a person who believes that he or she is a client dealing with a
lawyer.”).
28
Ward Bower, Law Firm Marketing: Intellectual Property Practice Strategies, N.Y. L. J.,
Dec. 20, 2004, at 4.
29
Jyoti Kamal and Rahul Kumar, U.S. legal claims processing to be increasingly offshored
to India, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004 (citing Stites & Harbison, a 250-lawyer Louisvillebased law firm).
30
Renee Deger, More companies now follow DuPont’s ‘Legal Model, NAT’L L.J., May 17,
2004, at S6 (quoting a Texas lawyer who used Atlas Legal Research to draft a pretrial motion).
See also Geanne Rosenberg, Offshore legal work continues to make gains, NAT’L L. J., May 17,
2004, at S3 (noting Hildebrandt International, a law firm consulting firm, reported that the
“categories of legal work that have been performed offshore by non-U.S. lawyers include legal
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performed by lawyers, paralegals, or other support staff working under the
supervision of lawyers.
Intermediary outsourcing firms have been organized in the U.S. and
abroad to take advantage of the interest of corporate law departments and law
firms.31 Several outsourcing intermediary firms were founded by U.S. lawyers
with elite credentials, including Mindcrest (Ganesh Natarajan and George
Hefferan, both formerly with McGuire Woods’s Chicago office 32 ) and Atlas
Legal Research (Abhay “Rocky” Dhir, former law clerk to U.S. District Judge
Jerry Buchmeyer 33 ). Other outsourcing firms have been organized in India,
including Manthan Services, which has “120 Indian-trained lawyers, including
two UK qualified solicitors and 50 senior lawyers”34 and IP Pro, an affiliate of a
Mumbai law firm.35 These outsourcing intermediaries identify foreign lawyers to
work on outsourced projects, communicate assignments to them, set and collect
fees, and might even provide U.S.-lawyer review of the finished product.36 Each
of the outsourcing firms is careful to note that they are not providing “legal
services” and are not involved in any lawyer-client relationship.
research; assistance in the drafting of legal memos and briefs; discovery work; assembling facts in
support of litigation claims; and patent, trademark and ERISA work.”).
31
Intermediary firms for outsourcing legal services include Mindcrest, Atlas Legal
Research, Intellevate, Lawwave.com, Lexadign Solutions, OfficeTiger and Quislex, IP Pro. Joy
London, in her blog www.excitedutterances.com, has identified 29 outsourcing intermediary firms
in India; see
http://excitedutterancesblogspot.com/2005_08_01_excitedutterances_archive.html#112544823759
972718 (last visited Oct. 6, 2005); The Inside Scoop on Legal Outsources, CORP. COUNS., Dec.
2004, at 59; Helen Coster, supra note 26. See generally, Krishan supra note 16.
32
Geanne Rosenberg, supra note 30; Ameet Sachdev, Law firms slow to outsource –
Confidentiality outweighs savings, CHICAGO TRIB., Jan. 19, 2004.
33
John Council, Lawyer sets up research business: Indian lawyers service small firms and
solos in Texas, NAT’L L.J., May 17, 2004, at 51. In addition, a 2004 joint venture was formed
between OfficeTiger and law firm consultants Hildebrandt International. Law Firm Outsourcing
Is Aim of New Joint Venture, posted June 8, 2004 on SBPOA, available at
http://www.sharedxpertise.org (last visited July 15, 2004).
34
William O’Shea, Caseload grows for advocates in absentia, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct.
10, 2004, at 10.
35
Karl Schoenberger, Looking for Legal Work Companies Turn to India to Save Lawyer
Expense, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE (Georgia), Jan. 23, 2005, at F01; Law Firm Outsourcing Is Aim of
New Joint Venture, supra note 33 (Mindcrest also boasted that “many of [its] outsourced
lawyers . . . had training from U.S. law schools . . . ”).
36
Helen Coster, supra note 26 (“There are a few different emerging models. Vendors like
Lexadigm Solutions and Lawwave.com rely exclusively on Indian lawyers to conduct low-level
legal work and analysis. Others, like OfficeTiger, use a mix of lawyers and trained professionals
to handle legal and non-legal tasks such as managing conflicts databases and document
management and review. A few vendors specialize. Intellevate has hired an Indian staff of
lawyers and Ph.D.s to conduct patent research and other IP work. The company has a dedicated
team devoted just to Microsoft’s patent work.”).
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More insight into outsourcing might be gained by focusing on the
substantive areas of law involved. Much of the outsourced work sent offshore by
law firms relates to patent law. This may be revealing in itself of the limits of
outsourcing, since patent law is highly technical and involves engineering
expertise, as well. One description of patent application work divided a
hypothetical application project into six separate tasks in addition to compiling
and integrating the application. Each of these tasks might be outsourced and
several involve activities that easily could fall outside of the definition of legal
services, including searching for prior art, drafting specifications and preparing
drawings.37 Certain Indian-based outsourcing firms focus specifically on services
related to “patent research, analysis, drafting and patent record management.”38
Other areas of law also lead to outsourcing offshore. General research
projects have been the subject of offshore outsourcing arrangements, including a
search for the law in each U.S. jurisdiction related to a particular insurance matter,
for example.39 The outsourcing firm, Lexadigm, reported that its work included
preparation of briefs for submission to the U.S. Supreme Court and several Circuit
Courts of Appeals. 40 Even aspects of mergers and acquisitions have been
outsourced offshore.41
Offshore outsourcing typically is sold as a means to save money. The
fees for lawyers in India – the most typical site of offshore outsourcing of legal
services to date – are extraordinarily low compared to U.S. law firm rates. For
example, rates charged by the outsourcing intermediary, Lexadigm, for legal
research range from $60 to $80 per hour depending upon the turnaround time
required. Lexadigm advertises these services as being performed by its “research
37

See Alok Aggarwal, Offshoring Patent Drafting and Prosecution Services,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY, 5.05, at 38-39 (2005) (“A patent application typically consists
of the following activities: (a) prior art searching, (b) drafting background, (c) drafting
specifications, (d) drafting claims, (e) drafting summary, (f) preparing drawings, and (g) a final
review, modifications and filing. Although the last activity has to be always performed by a
USPTO registered attorney or agent, who usually also becomes the attorney of record, other
activities can be either done by the IP professionals in a remote location or by the IP professional
located in the US.”); Braga, supra note 4; Karl Schoenberger, supra note 35.
38
William O’Shea, supra note 34.
39
Helen Coster, supra note 26 (quoting sole practitioner Solan Schwab: “’When I go home
at 6, I can have them do the grunt work, research, and proofreading that I would otherwise have
other people do,” says Solan Schwab, a New York-based solo practitioner who outsources
research projects like analyzing state-by-state insurance regulations with QuisLex, which has 12
lawyers in Hyderabad. “Then, when I come in in the morning, I receive a beautiful e-mail with
research done exactly how I like it.’”). See also Kamal & Kumar, supra note 29 (describing Stites
& Harbison’s use of offshore outsourcing for legal research).
40
Interview with Puneet Mohey, President of Lexadigm, for NPR, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4626716 (last visited July 17, 2006). This
is further discussed in Krishan, supra note 16.
41
Kamal & Kumar, supra note 29.
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specialists” who are Indian law school graduates with several years of work
experience.42 Another source puts the hourly rate for Indian lawyers as low as $2
per hour.43 The cost differential obviously is significant for lawyers working in a
variety of organizations in the United States including sole practitioners, one of
whom reported using offshore outsourcing to accommodate the “erratic workflow that doesn’t justify the overhead of a full-time [U.S.-licensed] staff.”44
Aside from cost savings, offshore outsourcing also captures time
efficiencies related to the time change between the outsourcer’s location and the
site of the recipient of the outsourcing assignment. DuPont initially decided to
outsource patent application work to Indian scientists in order to save money, “but
soon found there were additional benefits from the 10-hour time difference, such
as being able to send assignments as you leave for the day and having the work
completed when he arrived the next morning.” 45 The same time difference,
however, also has been cited as a negative factor against outsourcing because it
serves as a barrier to the communication between the outsourcer and receiving
attorneys and the effective supervision over the work outsourced.46
Nevertheless, top U.S. law firms generally focus on providing
sophisticated services and are unlikely to embrace offshore outsourcing as a new
organizational model. These firms, which certainly include those on the
American Lawyer list of the 200 highest-grossing United States law firms,47 focus
on cutting-edge and high fees work at the opposite end of the spectrum from the
routine and low-level work currently being outsourced offshore.48 What they are
42

See http://www.lexadigm.com/about.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2005). Lexadigm
attorneys earn between $6,000 and $36,000 annually, according to Daniel Brook, Made in India,
LEGAL AFF., May/June 2005, available at www.legalaffairs.org.
43
Laxmi Devi, Indian legal eagles wing their way to BPOs, ECON. TIMES, June 9, 2005.
44
Helen Coster, supra note 26.
45
Jeff Blumenthal, A Gateway to India? THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 18, 2005.
46
Id. (“When I assign work to an associate or a paralegal, they come into my office and we
go through several iterations when we are dealing with a patent application,” [Gregory] Lavorgna
[chairman of IP firm Drinker Biddle & Reath] said. “And that's just harder to do when they are so
far away. We have looked into it and I know it is a way to control costs. I just don't think it will
wind up saving firms as much as advertised when you factor everything into the equation.”).
47
See The Am. Law 200, AM. LAW., Aug. 2005.
48
This is not to say that sophisticated work might not be outsourced offshore in the future.
But see comment of Gregg Kirchhoefer in Bellman and Koppel, supra note 21; comment of Bruce
MacEwen, Adam Smith, Esq., Aug. 30, 2005,
http://www.bmacewen.com/blog/archives/globalization (last visited Oct. 6, 2005) (“While the
future projections come from consultants with, the cynical might say, an interest in generating
excitement about the numbers, they forecast 35,000 “US law jobs” moving to India by 2010 and
just over twice that number by 2015. Does “US law jobs” strike you as a fuzzphrase? (A: Yes.) Are these Bates-stamping clerks and digital-scanning jockeys, or AmLaw 100
partner equivalents? My guess is that for the duration of the careers of most of you reading this, it
will not be the latter.”).
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selling is more judgment and experience than legal research. It is anathema to the
identities of these firms, as providers of highly sophisticated expertise, to connect
with service providers at the other end of the spectrum, whose attraction is their
low cost. However, the more routine aspects of their work is critical to their
ability to train new lawyers, in order to offer sufficient routine and lower-stakes
experiences to allow their development of the kind of judgment that forms the
basis for the reputations of top lawyers at these firms.
Reputation for quality is among the most important assets of any law firm,
whether or not its work actually includes more routine services. An offshore
outsourcing relationship may be perceived as undermining that reputation because
of the suspicion that foreign legal education and training is different and
consequently of lower quality.49 In addition, there is a built-in assumption in the
market for sophisticated legal advice that the client gets what it pays for, so a
higher billing rate indicates higher quality of the advice and advisor. Outsourcing
admits commodification – an admission few firms will concede even if there is no
rational basis for claiming participation in the high-fees-sophisticated tier of the
market. Perhaps few clients, too, would be satisfied with the moniker “routine”
attached to the legal issues that cause them to retain outside counsel.
Finally, to the extent we limit our discussion to offshore outsourcing that
utilizes non-U.S. law graduates, the distance between U.S.-based elite firms and
outsourcing deepens. U.S. firms have been reluctant to include foreign-trained
lawyers in their organizations, even as such lawyers have become an increasing
presence in United States law schools. Law firms point to state regulations that
limit the ability of foreign lawyers to sit for the bar examination as one
justification for their exclusion. But the reluctance to embrace foreign-educated
lawyers is limited in large part to the location of their offices. U.S. firms rely
increasingly on foreign lawyers to staff their foreign offices.50 Regulation plays a
part, but economics does, too – hiring local lawyers is less expensive in terms of
compensation (including cost of living and hardship allowances, for example),
stability and retention, which can be costly for law firms. But as to their domestic
offices and practices, United States firms’ reluctance to hire foreign-trained
lawyers likely relates to three factors: first, the assumption that most foreign
lawyers will return to their home jurisdictions after a relatively brief period in the
United States; second, a concern that training foreign lawyers may require more
49

Of course, certain outsourcing providers may be U.S.-trained lawyers. This is not the
common model, however. See, e.g., interview with Puneet Mohey, supra note 40 (reporting that
none of Lexadigm’s employees are U.S.-trained lawyers). Nonetheless, a number of the
outsourcing intermediary firms were created by U.S.-educated and licensed, experienced lawyers,
whose participation in the venture provides legitimacy and trustworthiness.
50
Most of these foreign-educated lawyers working in foreign offices of the top 60 U.S. law
firms have not earned LLMs or other law degrees in United States law schools. See Silver,
Winners and Losers in the Globalization of Legal Services, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 897 (2005).
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time than training their U.S.-educated counterparts; and third, the nature of the
work assigned to new law graduates, which is intensely language-focused and
consequently presents a considerable challenge to foreign-educated lawyers
whose first language is not English.
Offshore outsourcing does present opportunities for U.S. law firms. The
potential for cost saving is important and firms may be willing to outsource work
they characterize as “non-legal” or support services. In addition, firms with
international offices may see offshore outsourcing as an opportunity to develop
relationships with local lawyers in jurisdictions otherwise closed to foreign firms,
such as India, where the local rules prevent United States and other non-Indian
firms from operating openly. When Indian regulations are liberalized, these firms
may use their relationships to build their own offices, or bring the outsourcing
workers “in-house.”
While law firms may dabble in offshore outsourcing, corporate legal
departments reportedly have been more seriously engaged in taking advantage of
the cost savings available by sending some of their work offshore. The general
pressure on corporate officers to lower costs also applies to legal costs. In
addition, corporate general counsel (GCs) may be more likely to try offshore
outsourcing than law firms because they are influenced by the successful
experiences of other corporate departments that have outsourced work overseas.51
According to Ganesh Natarajan, a founder of Mindcrest, a legal outsourcing firm
based in Chicago, “Corporate law departments … are much more apt [than law
firms] to make use of outsourced legal staff, often because other corporate
divisions also have cut costs through outsourcing.”52
In analyzing offshore outsourcing in the corporate counsel context, we are
mindful that the line distinguishing lawyers from non-lawyers in terms of function
is blurred. Corporations use lawyers in a variety of capacities that do not require
a license .53 Corporate compliance officers are an example of corporate positions
that may be staffed with lawyers, and when they are, may assume a more “law
minded” role that influences the relationship with the corporation’s general
counsel. As one article on legal outsourcing recently noted, “[w]hat constitutes
51

According to Leon Steinberg, CEO of Intellevate, an Indian outsourcing firm, “’The
Fortune 500s are already doing work overseas. If they have research facilities in India, they know
they can put their legal over there as well.’” William O’Shea, supra note 34.
52
Law Firm Outsourcing Is Aim of New Joint Venture, The Shared Services and Business
Processing
Outsourcing
Ass’n,
June
8,
2004,
available
at
http://www.sharedxpertise.org/modules.php?file=article&name=News&op=modload&sid=1519
(last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
53
For example, compliance officers may or may not be lawyers. See generally Ben W.
Heineman, Jr., Imagination At Work, AM. LAW., April 2006, at 73 (describing the importance of
lawyers as “members of the business team” and reporting on several GE general counsel who
moved into business roles).
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lawyering can get fuzzy.”54
Moreover, corporations already outsource their legal work to outside
counsel on a regular basis. When they turn to non-U.S. lawyers in an offshore
outsourcing relationship, the GCs may need to assume more responsibility for
monitoring the work of those performing the work but the nature of the
relationship between the GC and the lawyers performing the outsourced work is
not substantially different whether the outsourcing lawyer is licensed in the same
jurisdiction as the GC and works in a law firm down the street from the
corporation’s office or is licensed in a foreign jurisdiction and occupies an office
thousands of miles away.
General Electric and DuPont have led the charge on offshore outsourcing
of legal services. GE reportedly hired and trained Indian lawyers to create its own
in-house Indian legal staff.55 According to one report, “By creating its own inhouse legal department in India, GE reports that in 2001 its plastics division saved
approximately half a million dollars that would otherwise have been spent on
American advice purchased from American law firms. By 2002, those savings
had already increased by 40%.” 56 The DuPont Legal Model advocates using
alternatives to outside law firms, including outsourcing to U.S.-licensed
temporary attorneys and offshore outsourcing. 57 Other corporations that
reportedly have outsourced certain legal work offshore include BorgWarner, 58
Cisco Systems,59 Microsoft,60 and the Andrew Group.61 These companies have
outsourced research relating to patent applications and IP prosecution, among
other matters; suggestions for outsourcing offshore also include reviewing
documents for discovery, preparing “first drafts of responses to interrogatories, or
54

Nathan Koppel, Nation Builder, CORP. COUNSEL, Jan. 2005, at 100 (describing the role of
a Reed Smith partner, Sanjoy Bose, who also serves as president of project finance consulting firm,
GFS Group).
55
See Coster, supra note 26 (“In 2001, General Electric Company established a legal team
in Gurgaon, India, with lawyers and paralegals who draft documents like contracts.”).
56
Rich Smith, A Passage to India, The Motley Fool, Jan. 26, 2004, available at
http://www.fool.com/news/commentary/2004/commentary040126rs.htm (last visited Feb. 17,
2005).
57
Renee Deger, supra note 30.
58
Ellen L. Rosen, Corporate America Sending More Legal Work to Bombay, NY TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2004, § 10, at 1.
59
Geanne Rosenberg, On the Web; Use of offshore legal work makes gains with help of
Internet, telecommunications and Ernest Hemingway, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., Sept. 2, 2004
at 9.
60
Karl Schoenberger, supra note 35.
61
The Andrew Group is “an Orland Park, Ill., manufacturer of telecom infra-structure
equipment, [that] has cut back on its use of American outside counsel by sending more of its
patent application work to Baldwin Shelston Waters, a law firm in Wellington, New Zealand.”
Fried, supra note 20.

12

[doing] privilege reviews …”.62 West Publishing uses Indian lawyers to prepare
their case summaries.63
Nevertheless, even among GCs offshore outsourcing is not uniformly
embraced; indeed, according to a 2004 survey of 167 Chief Legal Officers
conducted by the Association of Corporate Counsel and Altman Weil, Inc., fewer
than 2% of the corporations surveyed use offshore outsourcing for any of their
legal or back office work, while 8% predicted they would consider offshore
outsourcing for legal and/or back office work in the foreseeable future.64 Only
1.2% of the 149 respondents to a survey by the Corporate Legal Times, the source
for their 8th Annual Report of Corporate Law Departments, indicated that they had
outsourced work to foreign firms as a way to control costs, compared to 8.4%
who indicated that they had outsourced work to U.S. law firms.65
The reluctance to invest more in offshore outsourcing may be related to
concerns about the need for supervision and monitoring. Generally, GCs
purchase expertise in their use of outside counsel, supplementing their own
substantive knowledge and familiarity with their company’s operations with the
expertise of lawyers working in firms, whose experience in representing multiple
clients gives them insight into a larger and different context of legal issues than
that available to an in-house lawyer. It is the judgment and experience of the
outside counsel that makes them valuable, although technical and more routine
tasks also likely are performed. In offshore outsourcing, GCs essentially are
going in the opposite direction: rather than buying expertise they are buying
services for which they must serve as a reviewer and expert supervisor. Such
supervision reduces the cost savings attainable through outsourcing. Of course,
the GCs might contract with their outside firm to perform the reviewing and
monitoring function, but in either case, review costs money. In expressing
concerns about the quality of offshore outsourcing services, GCs may in fact be
concerned about the efficiency of outsourcing in light of this need for supervision.
That which is outsourced returns as increased demand for high-level supervision
within the GC’s organization.66
Nevertheless, outsourcing offshore allows GCs to challenge the traditional
role of the corporate law firm. Sending routine matters offshore through
62

Rees Morrison, Litigation Fee Liposuction, CORP. COUNSEL Oct. 2003, at 71.
Rich Smith supra note 56.
64
Survey results are available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/CLO2004.pdf and
http://www.altmanweil.com/pdf/CLO2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). Among the companies
considering outsourcing legal work in the future is Speedera Networks, which may or may not
have participated in the survey. See Karl Schoenberger, supra note 35.
65
8th Annual Report of Corporate Law Departments, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 2005.
66
Jeff Blumenthal, supra note 45 (quoting Mike Walker, DuPont’s chief IP counsel,
referring to outsourced patent application work performed by Indian scientists: “we found that it
takes some extra effort on our part to make sure the quality is where we want it”).
63
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outsourcing arrangements removes the work that law firms often use to train new
lawyers. Moreover, engaging outside law firms to monitor and supervise the
outsourcing work of foreign lawyers causes firms to interact with foreign lawyers
performing the outsourced work, and without this incentive from the client, the
law firms and outsourcing lawyers may be unlikely to interact. By enabling
offshore outsourcing, globalization thus brings new power to GCs, who can
instruct outside firms to develop relationships with the foreign lawyers they select.
GCs in this way have more leverage over the internal structure of their outside
law firms and may demand international staffing in the same way that they
demand diversity.67
For foreign lawyers who receive the outsourcing assignments, working as
an outsourcing lawyer offers the opportunity to take advantage of globalization’s
ability to destabilize the local legal market.68 In India, for example, success in the
legal profession is closely related to social status. “The combination of caste with
social networks produces a highly stratified profession.” 69 At the same time,
regulation keeps the Indian legal market essentially closed to foreign lawyers and
law firms. But globalization, through outsourcing, allows the local and foreign
lawyers to meet and bypass the rigidity characteristic of the old professional
hierarchies. Indian lawyers can gain status offered by globalization without
leaving home by linking with foreigners through an outsourcing relationship, even
though the local profession remains closed to foreign lawyers and firms.70 The
association brought by outsourcing with foreign clients, law firms and with U.S.
law itself brings prestige to the local outsourcing lawyers. Moreover, the salaries
for outsourcing work exceed local pay scales. 71 Local lawyers may even gain
important skills and training. According to one source, there are significant
problems with quality of legal education in India, and local lawyers may receive
training from the outsourcing firms that could compensate for this.72
67

Heather Smith, Hue and Cry: Firms Have Begun to Respond to Wal-Mart’s Urgent Call
for Diversity Action, AM. LAW. Sept. 2005, at 18.
68
See Krishan, supra note 16 for an excellent review of the current conditions in the Indian
legal market. See generally, Galanter, Goonesekere and Twining, Report of the Expert Panel on
the
National
Law
School
of
India
University,
(1996)available
at
http://www.marcgalanter.net/Documents/papers/scannedpdf/reportoftheexpertpanel.pdf
(last
visited Aug. 5 2006).
69
J.S. Ghandi, Past and Present: A Sociological Portrait of the Indian Legal Profession, in
Abel and Lewis, LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, 369, 376 (1988).
70
According to one lawyer working at Pangea3, a legal outsourcing firm with offices in
India, working conditions also are better at outsourcing firms compared to a “standard Indian law
firm.” Eric Bellman and Nathan Koppel, More U.S. Legal Work Moves to India’s Low-Cost
Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2005, at B1.
71
Id.
72
See Ghandi, supra note 69. On the training provided by outsourcing firms, see the
description on the web site of Mindcrest, one of the legal outsourcing firms using Indian trained
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Outsourcing, then, offers rewards to both local lawyers and those entities
initiating the outsourcing relationship, but also brings risks of increased costs and
potential injury to reputation. Offshore outsourcing arrangements open spaces for
local lawyers to obtain additional opportunities that otherwise might well be
closed to them because of local hierarchies. For GCs initiating the outsourcing
referral, offshore outsourcing offers potential cost savings and also the
opportunity to influence the role and composition of outside law firms. Finally,
law firms might use outsourcing to develop relationships with local lawyers when
they cannot directly enter the local market because of restrictive regulations.
Openly embracing offshore outsourcing, however, may negatively impact U.S.
law firms’ reputations and ability to market themselves as high-end advisers. For
certain law firms, this risk is likely to tip the balance away from offshore
outsourcing because of the threat to firms’ core identities and roles.
II: A Relational Framework for Offshore Outsourcing
Offshore outsourcing of non-legal work may raise political issues but it
does not trigger ethical concerns. Rather, it is in the offshore outsourcing of legal
services that ethical issues are implicated. The nature of outsourcing – the
disaggregation of services into separate component parts, distributed to various
service providers – also complicates the determination of the ethical issues
involved. This division of services into discrete segments focuses attention on the
service providers involved in aspects of legal services that traditionally would be
subsumed in the finished product. While a project in total may clearly involve
legal services and the expertise of a lawyer, the component parts may be
characterized as non-legal once divided from their context. Part of the task in
assessing the ethical issues involved in offshore outsourcing, then, is to determine
what sort of services we are concerned about when discussing the ethical
implications of offshore outsourcing.
Instead of trying to determine whether a particular activity involves the
practice of law, however, we focus here on understanding the relationships
created by offshore outsourcing and examine how they differ from more
traditional relationships of lawyers and clients. The following Case Studies ## 17, infra, clarify the continuum from typical lawyer-client and lawyer-lawyer
relationships to those accomplished through an outsourcing arrangement.
In Case Study # 1, the client hires lawyer L-1 to work on a particular
problem or project, and L-1 delegates certain tasks associated with the project to
others within her firm. She might delegate certain functions to specialists who
will use their substantive expertise to resolve specific issues, such as tax or
lawyers, available at http://www.mindcrest.com/careers.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2006) (“Our
most important asset is our human capital. We recruit the best and provide them with the resources
to develop as professionals. Through rigorous training and systematic performance reviews, we
encourage continuous improvement in everything we do.”).
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environmental concerns, and other tasks to younger lawyers with lower hourly
billing rates in order to help conserve the client’s resources.73 In each of these
examples, L-1 segments certain tasks and sends them to others in her organization.
Outsourcing takes this delegation one step further by sending the tasks to a
lawyer (or law firm, as in Case Study # 5) who works outside of L-1’s
organization. By outsourcing, L-1 loses at least some – and perhaps total - control
over the work she delegates. While L-1 can direct her in-firm associates to work
on the project in a particular manner, when she outsources the work she abdicates
some control over the direction and monitoring of the way in which the work will
be accomplished by the lawyer who receives the outsourcing assignment, whom
we will call L-O. Outsourcing involves not only a loss of control over the manner
of work but also over the physical aspects of the work, which raises questions
such as where the work will be performed, access to the work site, and risks posed
by the work site to maintaining confidentiality of the client’s information. 74
Moreover, by outsourcing the work, L-1 introduces uncertainty into her
relationship with her client, since L-O may desire direct contact with the client
while L-1 may wish to not divulge to the client the fact that she is outsourcing
part of the job at all. When the outsourcing is sent to a non-U.S. lawyer working
outside of the U.S., as in Case Study # 7, the issues are magnified – more distance
yields less control.
We can imagine a continuum of lawyer-client and lawyer-lawyer
relationships in which offshore outsourcing to a non-US lawyer is at one extreme,
and delegation to a lawyer in the same law firm office occupies the opposite end
of the spectrum. In between are intermediate steps of delegation:
- Case Study # 2: L-1 refers the matter to lawyers in a branch office of
the same law firm;
-

Case Study # 3: L-1 refers the matter to lawyers working for her law
firm in its non-U.S. office;
Case Study # 4: L-1 hires a temporary lawyer to work on the project
under her supervision and in space provided by her firm;
Case Study # 5: L-1 refers the matter to a lawyer/law firm occupying
offices in the same city as she works, but unaffiliated with her firm;75
Case Study # 6: L-1 refers the matter to an outsourcing firm that hires

73

Skadden Arps reportedly utilizes a system to channel work to the most efficient
worldwide location, as described by Leigh Jones in The 24-hour Firm, supra note 9.
74
Confidentiality is a serious problem, as evidenced by “the University of California at San
Francisco Medical Center’s recent scare over patient medical records. A woman in Pakistan hired
to transcribe patient records threatened to reveal patient information if she was not paid money a
subcontractor owed her.” Deger, supra note 30.
75
Such a referral may occur because L-1 or her firm is conflicted out of representing the
client on the particular matter.
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non-US lawyers in a foreign jurisdiction to perform the work;
- Case Study # 7: L-1 refers the matter to a non-U.S. lawyer/law firm
situated in a foreign jurisdiction and who is unaffiliated with her firm.
Each of these delegation relationships can be analyzed according to the sorts of
controls that L-1 retains: control through physical proximity, control through an
employment or partnership relationship, and control through the ability to
effectively monitor as a result of L-1’s familiarity with the law being applied by
L-O. Figure 1 organizes these various relationships according to these three
control mechanisms.

17

Figure 1: Case Studies
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Each of the relationships in Case Studies ## 1-4 enable L-1 to maintain
control on the basis of an employment or partnership relationship with the lawyer
receiving the referral, L-O. In these instances, L-O’s interest in maintaining his
reputation with L-1 and within the firm generally supports the notion of control.
This means that L-O will self-monitor for quality of work and timeliness, among
other factors, so that even if L-1 cannot effectively review L-O’s work product
because L-O must apply foreign law or expertise with which L-1 is unfamiliar or
it is not cost-effective for L-1 to supervise closely, L-1 nevertheless may trust that
L-O will not exceed the boundaries of his competence. While temporary lawyers
(Case Study # 4) do not share the same employment or partnership relationship
with L-1 as the other relationships described above, the temporary lawyer is likely
to be motivated by the same reputational interests as lawyers in L-1’s firm so that
L-1 will retain him again. 76 Moreover, the employment and even quasiemployment relationships support the confidentiality of client information.77
In contrast, the relationships in Case Studies ## 5-7, including referrals to
lawyers in different law firms regardless of their location and through outsourcing
intermediaries, lack the same reputational connection. Of course, reputation still
matters; it is unlikely that L-1 would refer a matter to any lawyer without some
knowledge or experience relating to the lawyer’s abilities. But once the matter is
referred out, L-1’s awareness of L-O’s performance as well as her ability to
influence L-O is greatly reduced.78 Instead, L-1’s best option for monitoring LO’s performance is her ability to review the work of L-O; this, in turn, depends
upon whether she receives that work instead of it being sent directly to the client,
and whether she has the time and expertise to assess it.79 In outsourcing, it is
likely that L-O will accomplish the outsourced tasks and return the work product
to L-1, giving L-1 the ability to monitor through review of the work. In a typical
referral relationship, on the other hand, L-O would not return his work product to
L-1. Thus, outsourcing provides some measure of control by the referring
attorney, L-1, that is absent in a typical referral relationship. Nevertheless, the
efficiency of L-1’s ability to monitor based on common education and expertise is
76

See Deger, supra note 30 (According to Thomas Sager, then chief litigation counsel at
DuPont, “the temporary agency . . . uses many of the same lawyers repeatedly, so they have come
to know and understand DuPont’s methods).
77
Coster, supra note 26 (discussing the concern in outsourcing that two different firms will
use the same group of lawyers in the offshore location and that client confidences will
inadvertently be shared as a result. Orrick Herrington and Sutcliff for example, uses contract
lawyers but keeps them in the same location as the firm’s permanent legal staff.).
78
See Coster, supra note 26 (“Many lawyers feel uncomfortable with the idea of
outsourcing work to professionals who they’ve never trained, let alone met, yet whose work
reflects the quality of the firm.”).
79
See id. (citing concern regarding the time required to review outsourced work as
inefficient).
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necessarily limited both by the cost of L-1’s time and the nature of the matter
undertaken by L-O. The more detailed the review by L-1 of L-O’s work product,
the less savings afforded by referring the matter to L-O, since the cost of L-1’s
time spent on reviewing the work will reduce the cost savings.80 On the other
hand, even if L-1 reviews L-O’s work carefully, it may be difficult for her to
reach a conclusion about the advice offered by L-O if L-O’s work relates to a
sophisticated legal issue that is outside of L-1’s area of expertise. Control through
this mechanism of shared education and licensing may be illusory. As a Florida
lawyer commented recently, “’It’s hard enough to assure quality work from
people in your own firm let alone people you don’t know who are located halfway
around the world.’’81
Of course, lawyers may contract for control and the right to supervise
outsourced work. L-1 and L-O might agree that L-O will communicate with the
client only through L-1, that all work produced by L-O be submitted to L-1 for
review, and that the work be performed in a setting monitored by L-1 for issues of
access and other matters affecting the ability to keep client information
confidential. The retention of control in this manner increases the costs
associated with outsourcing. In addition, depending upon the location of the
outsourced work, the enforceability of the contract may be at issue.82
III: Focusing on Professional Ethics and Tort Liability
A. An Overview
While the capability to offshore developed only recently, the principles of
professional ethics and tort liability that constrain a lawyer's decision to send
back-office and support functions, law-related services, or legal services 83 to

80
81

See Blumenthal, supra note 45 at 4.
Braga, supra note 4 (quoting Doc Benjamin, a Williams Parker Harrison Dietz & Getzen

partner).
82

See, e.g., Emily Umbright, Appearing in St. Louis, Indian advocate provides a legal
perspective on outsourcing work, ST. LOUIS DAILY RECORD/ST. LOUIS COUNTIAN, Aug. 23, 2005
(Indian law holds only the employer liable for breaches of confidentiality by leaks of information).
83
As discussed more fully, infra at notes 90-102 and accompanying text, the line between
legal services and law-related services is far from bright. This article adopts Model Rule 5.7(b)'s
definition of the phrase, “law-related services”:
services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in
substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not
prohibited as the unauthorized practice of law when provided by a
nonlawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 5.7(b) (2003).
The Model Rules definition is singularly unhelpful in trying to decide whether
a particular service is "legal" or "law-related." The Comment to the Rule provides
some, but not much, guidance.
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foreign lawyers or vendors are long standing. For example, a lawyer is generally
under no obligation to inform a client that other lawyers and non-legal personnel
within the lawyer's firm will be working on the client's matter.84 Thus, in Case
Studies 1-3, supra, L-1 may proceed without advising the client of the
involvement of L-1's associates, partners, or non-legal personnel.
In contrast, a lawyer must obtain a client's consent before associating with
an outside lawyer.85 This well established principle applies equally to Case Study
#5 (a referral to lawyers in a different law firm located in the same city as L-1)
and to Case Study #7 (a referral to non-U.S. lawyers working for a different law
firm in a non-U.S. location) and Case Study # 6 (a referral to an outsourcing
intermediary that will hire non-U.S. lawyers in a non-U.S. jurisdiction). 86 A
similar logic seems to compel the conclusion that the lawyer should inform the
client even if the work being sent to the offshore provider is law-related (i.e., not
"legal services") and is being sent to a foreign vendor rather than a foreign law
firm. The need for such advisement is especially obvious if the offshored work
involves confidential client information and/or there is any form of a financial
relationship between the provider and the law firm.87
Examples of law-related services include providing title insurance, financial
planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying,
economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and
patent, medical or environmental consulting.
Id., cmt.
84

The Comment to Model Rule 1.6 specifically notes:
Lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm's practice, disclose to each
other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has
instructed that particular information be confined to specified lawyers.
MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (2003).
85
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS THIRD, § 14, cmt. h, at 132; id. § 21,
cmt. e, at 177, RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY SECOND, § 18; Ronald D. Rotunda & John S.
Dzienkowski, LEGAL ETHICS - THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(2004-05 ed.).
86
One lawyer who outsources legal services has commented that it is not necessary to
advise the client provided that the referring lawyer closely supervises the receiving lawyer.
Outsourcing of Legal Work is Growing But There's Still Little Ethics Guidance, 21 ABA/BNA
LAWS. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 316 (June 15, 2005). His opinion is generally consistent with the
advice contained in Formal Opinion 88-356 issued by the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility and the opinions of some state bar association ethics committees
relating to the employment of temporary lawyers. Other committees disagree, calling for
mandatory disclosure. E.g., Oliver v. Bd. of Governors, 779 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1989) See generally
ABA/BNA LAWS. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 91:410 (2006). In light of this disagreement, the
authors maintain that non-disclosure remains a risky proposition with respect to a lawyer's ethical
responsibilities and potential tort liability.
87
E.g., Estate of Re v. Kornstein Veisz & Wexler, 958 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (A
conflict of interest may exist if certain of the lawyers in Law Firm A that had represented the
plaintiff in the underlying action were previously associated with Law Firm B, the law firm that
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A law firm or law department 88 seeking guidance on the principles of
professional ethics and tort liability that are likely to arise in a decision to offshore
legal services need look no further than the Restatements of both Agency and the
Law Governing Lawyers, case law on negligent referrals and failures to monitor
law firm employees, third-party organizations, and outside lawyers to whom
referrals have been made, and the provisions of ethics codes that place a particular
responsibility on lawyers to supervise the firm's lawyers, non-legal employees,
and under certain circumstances, third-parties.89
As noted earlier,90 offshoring frequently raises the threshold issue of the
unauthorized practice of law (UPL) because the work is being sent directly to
foreign lawyers who are not authorized to practice law in the United States or to
vendors outside the United States who employ the foreign lawyers and/or nonlegal professionals. Resolving the UPL issue is next to impossible for two

was acting as counsel for the defendant in that action, and Law Firm A had regularly accepted
referrals from Law Firm B).
The need for complete and accurate disclosure to a client concerning a law firm's
recommendation of a vendor, such as a document management company, to respond to discovery
requests is both a matter of ethics and managing client relationships. The strength of this
proposition is powerfully illustrated by the adverse reaction of the Adelphia Communications
Corp. (Adelphia) when it learned that the outside vendor that it had hired at the recommendation
of the law firm that was representing it in a very complex bankruptcy proceeding and criminal
investigation was partially owned by family members of the lawyers in the firm. Adelphi fired the
law firm and the ensuing publicity damaged the law firm's reputation. Robert Frank & Nathan
Koppel, Boies Office Send Clients to 3rd Firm With Family Ties, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2005, at
C1; Robert Frank, Adelphia, Boies Firm Agree to Split; Cable Company Asked Special Counsel to
Quit Over Ties to a Contractor, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2005, at A.3; Jonathan D. Glater, A Lion of
the Courtroom Hears His Critics Roar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2005, at C1; Anthony Lin, Boies
Schiller Dogged by Claims of Conflict Document Company Angers A Former Client, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 19, 2005, at 6.
88
Rule 1.1 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct defines
“law firm” as denoting, inter alia, “lawyers employed in . . . the legal department of a
corporation or other organization.” MODEL RULES PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002). This article
adopts the Rule 1.1 definition. References to a “law firm” include a legal department.
89
There are other substantive law dangers that a firm should be aware of, such as the
possibility that it might be considered a joint employer with an offshore vendor, exposing it to
potential liability for the employment law violations of the offshore company, that its transfer of
materials to an offshore company might violate a U.S. export law or the privacy laws of foreign
jurisdictions. E.g., Sam Ramanujan & Sandhya, A Legal Perspective on Outsourcing and
Offshoring, 8 J. AM. ACADEMY OF BUS. 51, 52-54 (2006). See also Richard F.D. Corley &
Elizabeth L. McNaughton, Current Issues in Outsourcing Transactions: Canadian Privacy Laws,
the Patriot Act and Other Considerations, N.Y.S.B.A. INT'L PRACTICUM, Autumn 2005, at 138;
Scott C. Harris, Outsourcing, Offshoring, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 2005, at 14; Judith A. Moldover,
Outsourcing: Who’s the Boss?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 4, 2005, at 9.
90
See supra, notes 25-28.
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reasons. 91 First, UPL jurisprudence with respect to outsourcing to U.S.-licensed
lawyers, foreign lawyers who are physically present in the United States,92 and
domestic vendors93 lacks coherence. Defining the activities that constitute UPL is
the responsibility of the states, and they have not taken a uniform view.94 The
efforts of the American Bar Association to assert a leadership role in the creation
of a national norm have failed miserably.95
Second, neither the courts nor bar regulators currently display any interest
in enforcing UPL prohibitions against organizations in analogous circumstances
involving the outsourcing within the United States of services that are arguably
legal in character. Legal research, 96 brief writing, 97 and discovery-related
activities98 are regularly undertaken by vendors without any protestation by the
courts or bar regulators. The likely, but generally unarticulated, justification for
their passivity is that the law firms and legal departments that retain these
organizations supervise them and bear a significant marketplace and reputational
risk if the organizations’ final product is sub par.
The courts and bar regulators view UPL enforcement fundamentally as a
91

This article consequently makes no attempt to define “legal services.” While the
offshoring of back office functions and law-related services does not raise UPL issues, it does
raise other ethical and liability issues such as confidentiality, competence, and monitoring. See
infra notes 118-38 and accompanying text.
92
E.g., In re Roel, 144 N.E.2d 24 (N.Y. 1957) (affirming a finding of criminal contempt
and the issuance of a preliminary injunction, restraining a Mexico-licensed lawyer physically
located in New York from giving advice limited to the domestic relations law of Mexico to clients
physically located in New York).
93
Outsourcing to domestic vendors raises UPL issues because both the courts and state bar
ethics committees have concluded that organizations may not employ lawyers to provide legal
services to the organizations' clients (as opposed to the organization itself). The prohibition
allegedly rests on the proposition that lawyers employed by an organization are less likely to be
able to exercise independence of professional judgment on behalf of the organizations' clients than
lawyers employed by law firms. History reveals, however, that the real purpose behind the
prohibition was to protect solo practitioners and small firms from competition. Bruce A. Green,
The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice:
Their Derivation, Their
Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1115 (2000).
94
See generally Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of
Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEG.
ETHICS 217, 248-52 (2000).
95
See American Bar Ass'n, Report of the Task Force on the Model Definition of the
Practice of Law (2004).
96
Legal research has been determined not to be the practice of law when it is undertaken by
a licensed lawyer for the benefit of other lawyers and the legal research is provided through an
entity separate from the lawyer's law firm. Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline, Op. 88-018 (1988).
97
Robert J. Ambrogi, Outsourced Legal Writing: If It’s Used With Caution, It Can Be A
Lifesaver, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 17, 2003, at C4.
98
See Litigation: A Special Report Support, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 22, 2004, at 34-37.
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matter of consumer protection, generally focusing their limited resources on nonlawyers who mislead unsophisticated clients about the clients' rights in areas such
as immigration, domestic relations, bankruptcy, real estate, etc. 99 Lawyers are
punished only when their failure to supervise their employees facilitates the
employees' UPL activities 100 or when the lawyers deliberately assist the UPL
activities of affiliated organizations.101 Rarely are lawyers ever sanctioned for
assisting an out-of-state lawyer in the practice of law in a jurisdiction in which the
lawyer is not licensed.102
The prime consequence of this jurisprudential incoherence and regulatory
restraint is that law firms in deciding to offshore legal services likely face few or
no UPL hurdles as a practical matter. The courts and bar regulators will likely
continue to look the other way provided that consumer protection interests are not
implicated.103
For many years, the fear that nonlawyers would interfere with a lawyer's
99

Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Slavin, 62 Ohio Misc.2d 570, 608 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio Bd.
Comm’rs on the Unauthorized Practice of Law 1993).
100
E.g., In re Castorena, 270 B.R. 504 (Bank. D. Idaho 2001) (bankruptcy); In re Konohia,
550 S.E.2d 318 (S.C. 2001) (real estate). See also Jay M. Zitter, J.D., What Constitutes
Unauthorized Practice of Law by Paralegal, 109 A.L.R.5th 275 (2005).
101
E.g., Bluestein v. State Bar of California, 529 P.2d 599 (Cal. 1975) (disciplining a lawyer
for referring a criminal matter involving a foreign jurisdiction to a lawyer whom he believed was
admitted in New York and had practice experience outside the United States); In re Flack, 33 P.3d
1281 (Kan. 2001) (disciplining a lawyer for failing to supervise nonlawyers in connection with
estate planning ); Florida Bar v. Flowers, 672 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1996) (disciplining a lawyer for
failure to supervise nonlawyer immigration consultant who shared office space with the lawyer).
102
But see Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Pavlik, 732 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 2001)
(disciplining an Ohio lawyer who assisted an Illinois lawyer in practicing law in Ohio). See also
Ga. Ethics Op. 98-1 (1998) (A Georgia lawyer who acts as local counsel may risk discipline for an
out-of-state lawyer's discovery abuses under certain circumstances.) See generally Christine M.
Guerci, Vicarious Liability of Attorney for Acts of Associated Counsel, 35 A.L.R.5th 717 (1996 &
2004 Supp.); David A. Gerregano, J.D., What Constitutes “Unauthorized Practice of Law” by
Out-of-State Counsel, 83 A.L.R.5th 497 (2005).
On occasion, the courts have effectively “disciplined” an out-of-state lawyer for UPL by
imposing non-disciplinary sanctions. E.g., Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v.
Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998) (denying a New York law firm’s request for fees for
services that constituted the practice of law in California); Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Harman
Mining Corp., 568 S.E.2d 671 (Va. 2002) (dismissing a notice of appeal signed by an out-of-state
lawyer). See generally Sarah Diane McShea, Disgorgement of Fees and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law, 2002 PROF. LAW. 153 (2002). The Birbrower decision was in large measure the
impetus for the establishment of the ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice. At the
Commission's urging, the ABA amended Model Rule 5.5, expanding the circumstances in which a
lawyer could ethically practice law in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer was not licensed.
103
See generally American Bar Ass'n, 1999 Survey of Unauthorized Practice of Law
Committees (2000). Such interests might become implicated if, for example, the offshoring
involved debt collection work. See e.g., Boyd v. Wexler, 275 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001).
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exercise of independent professional judgment prompted the disciplinary
authorities, bar association ethics committees, and courts to use the threat of
potential UPL charges to discourage lawyers from establishing a law-related
business with a nonlawyer. They also disfavored law-related businesses even if
singly owned by a lawyer, fearing confusion by clients as to the nature of the
services being rendered and conflicts of interests caused by the lawyer's referral of
clients to the law-related business. While neither fear has entirely dissipated,
lawyers now may offer law-related services under certain circumstances pursuant
to ABA Model Rule 5.7.104
Model Rule 5.7 may directly impact a law firm's decision to offshore both
legal and law-related services. While it is difficult to obtain precise information
concerning the frequency and extent to which law firms and legal departments are
offshoring both types of services, news articles and interviews suggest that
offshoring occurs more frequently in connection with intellectual property matters
than in connection with other areas of the law.105 Some law firms have gone so
far as to establish ancillary businesses outside the United States to provide nonlegal services to their own clients, other law firms, and non-clients.106 These law
firms consequently face an additional, distinct challenge arising from Model Rule
5.7's ethical restraints on ancillary businesses. The fact that these businesses are
104

Model Rule 5.7 entitled “Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services” provides:
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect
to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the lawrelated services are provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's
provision of legal services to clients; or
(2) in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the lawyer individually or
with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a
person obtaining the law-related services knows that the services are not legal
services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.
(b) The term "law-related services" denotes services that might reasonably be
performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision of
legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when
provided by a nonlawyer.
See also supra note 78. See generally Robert R. Keatinge, Multidimensional Practice in a World
of Invincible Ignorance: MDP, MJP, and Ancillary Businesses after Enron, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 717
(2002); Lowell J. Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next Step, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1359 (2000); Henry Gottlieb, Ancillary Businesses Let Law Firms Provide a Fuller Range of
Services and Carner Revenue Beyond Hourly Billing, N.J.L.J., July 18, 2005, at 1; Leigh Jones,
Firms Not Minding Their Own Businesses, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 22, 2005, at 1.
105
See Coster, supra note 26; Jeff Blumenthal, “Region’s IP Lawyers Consider Offshore
Outsourcing,” DELAWARE LAW WEEKLY, May 25, 2005; see also US patent errors revealed,
Managing Intellectual Property, Feb. 2006 (reporting on mistakes identified in 1,600 patents
proofread by Intellevate).
106
See Coster, supra note 26.
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conducted in foreign countries is irrelevant to the Rule's applicability.107
B. The Ethical Duties of Supervision and Monitoring and Associated Tort
Liability
Many of the ethical principles governing the client-lawyer relationship and
the common law principles determining a lawyer's tort liability to a client with
respect to offshoring are rooted in Section 405 of the Restatement of the Law of
Agency. It provides in relevant part:
(2) An agent is subject to liability to the principal if, having a duty
to appoint or to supervise other agents, he has violated his duty
through lack of care or otherwise in the appointment or supervision,
and harm thereby results to the principal in a foreseeable manner.
He is also subject to liability if he directs, permits or otherwise
takes part in the improper conduct of other agents.
(3) An agent is subject to liability to a principal for the failure of
another agent to perform a service which he and such other have
jointly contracted to perform for the principal.108
107

Rule 8.5, Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law provides in relevant part:
(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is
subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the
lawyer's conduct occurs.
The comment to Rule 8.5 notes :
The choice of law provision applies to lawyers engaged in transnational
practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between
competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide
otherwise.
108
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY, § 405 (1958 & Supp. 2004).
Determining whether an individual or an entity is an agent, subagent, independent
contractor, servant or joint venturer involves a complex analysis that is outside the
scope of this article. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 1 cmt. 3
(describing the characteristics of an agent and independent contractor); id. § 5 (defining
subagents and subservants); id. § 220 (defining servant) (1958 & 2005 Supp.);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 (T.D. No. 2, 2001) (defining a joint venture).
Such determinations frequently turn on factual data relating to the degree and kind of
supervision exercised by a principal and/or agent.
Further complicating these determinations is the public policy question,
whether and to what extent should the existence of an underlying client-lawyer
relationship influence the application of the Restatement principles. Although an
individual or entity retained by a lawyer to provide legal or law-related services to a
client may be properly characterized as a servant, a subservant, a joint venturer, or an
independent contractor for some purposes by the Restatement, a court may not treat that
characterization as controlling in determining a lawyer's ethical responsibilities or tort
liability. See infra note 148 and accompanying text, describing the nondelegable
duties that a lawyer owes a client.
For the purposes of this article, it is assumed, unless otherwise noted, that the
relationship between the referring law firm and the offshore party performing the
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Applying Section 405 to a lawyer's decision to offshore legal services or
law-related services is theoretically straightforward. The lawyer must exercise a
duty of care in selecting and monitoring the offshore vendor. Section 405 does
not, however, impose vicariously liability on the lawyer for the vendor's
negligence.
Issues of Professional Conduct: Rules 5.1109 and 5.3110 of the Model Rules of
service satisfies the legal criteria for the creation of an agency relationship that is
derivative of the underlying attorney-client relationship.
109
Rule 5.1 provides:
(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together
with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a
law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the
firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer
conforms
to
the
Rules
of
Professional
Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the
Rules
of
Professional
Conduct
if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies
the
conduct
involved;
or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in
the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct
supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct
at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails
to take reasonable remedial action.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2002). See generally Thomas A. Kuczajda, Self
Regulation, Socialization, and The Role of Model Rule 5.1, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 119 (1998);
Robert R. Keatinge, The Floggings Will Continue Until Moral Improves: The Supervising
Attorney and His or Her Firm, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 279 (1998); Irwin D. Miller, Preventing
Misconduct by Promoting The Ethics of Attorneys' Supervisory Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
259 (1994); Note, Rachel Reiland, The Duty to Supervise and Vicarious Liability: Why Law
Firms, Supervising Attorneys and Associates Might Want to Take a Closer Look at Model Rules
5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL. ETHICS 1151 (2001).
110
Rule 5.3 provides:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated
with
a
lawyer:
(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other
lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that
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Professional Conduct create three categories of ethical responsibilities. The first
focuses on partners and lawyers who hold managerial responsibilities within a law
firm. They must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that "all lawyers in the firm conform to the
Rules of Professional Conduct"111 and that the conduct of a nonlawyer employed,
retained or associated with a lawyer" is "compatible with the professional
obligations of the lawyer."112 The second focuses on lawyers who have direct
supervisory authority over other lawyers and nonlawyers.113 Both sets of duties,
like Section 405 of the Restatement of Agency, create supervisory responsibilities
rather than vicarious responsibility.114 The third duty imposes direct liability on
lawyers for conduct by non-lawyers that violates the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other professional obligations of the lawyer. The lawyer incurs
liability if s/he either ratifies wrongful conduct or fails to take reasonable remedial
action.115 Particularly significant is the introductory language in Model Rule 5.3,
"a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer," because it
shows the broad range of relationships for which the lawyer must assume ethical
oversight. 116 There is ample caselaw under Rules 5.1 and 5.3 disciplining

would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged
in
by
a
lawyer
if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies
the
conduct
involved;
or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in
the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct
supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a
time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to
take reasonable remedial action.
Id. R. 5.3. See also In re Opinion No. 24 of the Committee on the Unauthorized
Practice of Law,
607 A.2d 962 (N.J. 1992) (While a lawyer may delegate tasks to a paralegal, the lawyer
must
directly supervise the paralegal even if the paralegal is an "independent paralegal" not
an
employee of the lawyer).
111
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
112
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
113
Compare R. 5.1(b) with R. 5.3(b).
114
American Bar Ass'n, A Legislative History: The Development of the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, 1982-1998 at 229 (1999). Furthermore, these supervisory ethical
responsibilities exist “even if state law provides certain damage limitations or exclusions for the
purpose of liability.” ABA Formal Op. 96-401(1996) (emphasis added).
115
Compare R. 5.1(c) with R. 5.3(c).
116
E.g., In re Flack, 33 P.3d 1281 (Kan. 2001) (disciplining a lawyer for failing to supervise
an estate planning company); Florida Bar v. Flowers, 672 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1996) (disciplining a
lawyer for failing to supervise an immigration consultant). See also Spencer v. Steinman, 179
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lawyers 117 for failing to properly supervise the work of associates 118 and
nonlawyer employees.119
Applied to the decision to offshore legal services, Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3
and the supporting caselaw clearly require a law firm to implement a policy of
instructing its offshore vendors and providers to conform to the ethical obligations
of the Model Rules and to adopt practices and procedures to monitor their
compliance. Without such policies, practices, and procedures firmly established,
lawyers run the serious risk of discipline. 120 It is impossible to describe the
content of those policies, practices, and procedures with any precision given the
little public knowledge that exists about the details of the working relationship
between law firms and the offshore vendors of legal and law-related services.
Certainly the starting place is the policies, practices, and procedures already in
place for monitoring and supervising a firm's lawyers, nonlawyer personnel, and
outside vendors. As explained in more detail below, 121 however, it is highly
unlikely that simply modifying existing policies and procedures will be sufficient
in light of the significant differences in foreign legal systems and professional
education.
In formulating the specific provisions of these policies, practices, and
procedures, a law firm must focus at a minimum on three substantive ethical

F.R.D. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (sanctioning a lawyer for a violation of Rule 45 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure by a paralegal in the lawyer's office).
117
In New York and New Jersey, law firms – as well as lawyers – may be disciplined. E.g.,
In re Law Firm of Wilens and Baker, 777 N.Y.S.3d 116 (1st Dep’t 2004); In re Ravich, Tobin,
Oleckna, Reitman & Greenstein, 715 A.2d 216 (1998), aff'd, 754 A.2d 554 (N.J. 2000); In re
Jacoby & Meyers, 687 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 1997).
118
E.g., In re Yacavino, 494 A.2d 801 (N.J. 1985) (criticizing a law firm's "sink or swim"
policy towards associates); In re Saab, 547 N.E.2d 919 (Mass. 1989) (disciplining a lawyer for
assigning a domestic relations matter to an inexperienced association whom the lawyer failed to
supervise); Attorney Grievance Comm. v. Ficker, 706 A.2d 1045 (Md. 1998) (disciplining a
lawyer for assigning a difficult drunk driving case to a novice lawyer and assigning too many
cases to too few lawyers); In re Moore, 494 S.E.2d 804, 807 (S.C. 1997) (disciplining a lawyer for
discovery failures even though the responsibility for responding to discovery demands was an
associate’s); People v. Kusick, 2001 WL 1161113 (Colo. O.P.D.J. June 6, 2001). See generally
Wilbur McCoy Otto, Identifying and Maintaining Lawyer Competence and Professionalism, 56
DEF. COUNSEL J. 288 (1989).
119
In re Jayson, 772 N.Y.S.2d 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (disciplining a lawyer who failed
to supervise two nonlawyer employees, as a result of which the lawyer filed an incorrect
Uncontested Matrimonial Checklist with a court); State v. Taylor, 4 P.3d 1242 (Okla. 2000)
(disciplining a lawyer who failed to supervise an employee with respect to the proper handling of a
client's funds). See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, What Constitutes Unauthorized Practice
of Law by Paralegal, 109 A.L.R.5th 275 (2005).
120
See supra notes 113-114.
121
See infra notes 128-38 and accompanying text.
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obligations:122 the duty to maintain confidentiality of client information,123 avoid
conflicts of interest,124 and provide competent representation.125
Observance of the duty of confidentiality requires a law firm to take
multiple affirmative measures to ensure that its offshore agents understand the
scope of a U.S. lawyer's duty to preserve information relating to the
representation of a client. Breeches of confidentiality not only violate the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 126 but they are also the basis of tort liability.
Lawyers have been held liable for both inadvertent127 and deliberate128 disclosures.
Establishing procedures and policies to protect offshored confidential
information and prevent illegal conduct such as insider trading does not require
law firms to reinvent the wheel.129 Rather, they can build on existing internal
procedures and policies that already have been implemented to prevent violations
122

Depending upon the financial arrangement between the law firm and the vendor, the law
firm may also need to address ethical issues relating to fees for legal services and the sharing of
legal fees with a non-lawyer. For example, one lawyer who outsources projects to India has
reported “I usually bill the clients a certain hourly rate and pay these folks a portion of that rate.”
Coster, supra note 26. Fee splitting with non-lawyers was a matter of particular concern when
businesses first began to offer temporary lawyer services. E.g., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
New York Comm. on Professional Ethics and Judicial Ethics, Formal Ops. 1989-2 (1989); id.,
Formal Ops. 1988-3 & 1988-3A (1988); N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
632 (1989); Fl. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 88-12 (1988). As the use of
temporary lawyers became more common, ethical inquiries shifted to the question whether and to
what extent a law firm could charge a client a “markup fee” for the services of a temporary lawyer.
E.g., D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 284 (1998). Because of the paucity of information on the fee
arrangements between law firms and offshore vendors, this article does not address ethical issues
relating to fees.
123
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003).
124
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8 & 1.9 (2003).
125
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2003).
126
See Oklahoma v. McGee, 48 P.3d 787 (Okla. 2002) (disciplining a lawyer for failing to
supervise his secretary who disclosed the confidential information of Client A to Client B).
127
E.g., Thiery v. Bye, 597 N.W.2d 449 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1999) (disclosure of client's
confidential medical information); Kohn v. Schiappa, 656 A.2d 1322 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1995) (disclosure of the identity of adopting parents to natural parents); In re Mandelman, 514
N.W.2d 11, 12 (Wisc. 1994) (disclosure of confidential information to non-affiliated lawyers).
128
Sherman v. Klopfer, 336 N.E.2d 219 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (disclosure of allegedly
improper accounting to the Internal Revenue Service); In Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf,
Burdman, Suignan & Eisenberg, 265 Cal.Rptr. 330 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (disclosure of the timing
of a client's bid for property); Lakoff v. Lionel Corp., 137 N.Y.S.2d 806 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955)
(disclosure of client's invention).
129
The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) mandates
that broker-dealers and investment advisors "establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and
procedures reasonably designed" to prevent insider trading. PUB. L. NO. 100-74. While a law
firm is neither a broker-dealer or investment advisor as defined by ITSFEA, the SEC has taken the
position that a law firm has an affirmative obligation to protect material, non-public information.
SEC REL. NO. 34-13437, 11 SEC Docket 2231 (1977).
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of U.S. securities and other relevant law.130 Firms without existing procedures and
policies will need to adopt similar measures.
Law firm procedures generally focus on securing documents containing
confidential information and include such measures as physically and
electronically segregating them, severely limiting access to them, restricting their
copying, tracking copies, shredding unnecessary copies, and inserting code names
in the documents and filing systems to mask the identity of the clients and other
parties. 131 Law firm policies focus on individuals, regularly reminding both
lawyers and non-lawyers of the critical importance of preserving the confidential
information, the dangers of conversations about client matters outside the law
firm, and the risks of disclosure by e-mail.132
The importance of these measures cannot be underestimated. While all
foreign jurisdictions in the common- and civil-law traditions acknowledge a
lawyer's duty to maintain client confidences in one form or another, the courts, the
organized bar, and the informal professional culture of a foreign country's legal
system may well shape the contours of that duty differently. China133 and the
Islamic countries where the shirah is
130

Despite a firm's best efforts, misconduct by lawyers and nonlegal personnel is
unavoidable. E.g., U.S.A. v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). See also Phyllis Diamond, Two
Plead Guilty to Insider Charges Involving Tips from Law Firm Secretar, 36 SEC. REG. & LAW REP.
1105 (June 21, 2004); Former Lawyer at BioTech Concern Given Prison Term in Insider Case, 36
SEC. REG. & LAW REP. 142 (Jan. 26, 2004); Joyce E. Cutler, Lawyer Pleads Guilty to Insider
Charges Over Acquisition of Software Company, 33 SEC. REG. & LAW REP. 1311 (Sept. 17, 2001);
IP Lawyer Sentenced After Pleading Guilty to Insider Trading, 33 SEC. REG. & LAW REP. 1758
(Dec. 17, 2001).
131
See Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, 2 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 13.9, at 334-35
(2005 ed.). See also Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, 1 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 2.25, at
257-60 (2005 ed.).
132
See Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, 2 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 13.9, at 334-35
(2005 ed.).
133
Law of the People's Republic of China on Lawyers, Arts. 33-34, 35(2), 46(6)-(7) & 51,
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=100 (last visited Mar. 3, 2006). It has been noted:
U.S. firms practicing in China . . . may encounter vastly different rules
concerning client confidences. At one time, Beijing even sent orders to
foreign law offices in China requiring quarterly reports on information
usually considered confidential by American lawyers, such as "client lists,
locations of projects under consideration, affiliations with Chinese law firms,
business reference lists, and the value of deals in negotiations.”
Mark I. Harrison & Mary Gray Davidson, The Ethical Implications of Partnerships and Other
Associations Involving American and Foreign Lawyers, 22 PENN. STATE INT'L L. REV. 639, 649
(2004) (citing, Yujie Gu, Note, Entering the Chinese Legal Market: A Guide for American
Lawyers Interested in Practicing Law in China, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 173, 191 (1999)). See also,
Charles Chao Liu, Note and Comment: China's Lawyer System: Dawning Upon the World
Through A Tortuous Process, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 1037 (2002); Shanghai Bar Drafts First Local
Code for Lawyers, http://www.china.org.cn/English/2002/Jan/25205/htm.
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adopted,134 for example, are certain to have radically different perspectives.
Law firms must be certain that their agents understand that the duty of
confidentiality generally extends to all information even if it is a matter of public
record135 and that the duty continues even when the engagement is over. On a
practical level, a law firm may be obligated to examine the offshore agent's hiring
practices to ensure that only reputable employees have access to confidential
information and that adequate measures are in place to prevent both physical and
electronic theft of the information. Even the vendor's recycling policies must be
examined.136
It may also be necessary to investigate the substantive law of the country
in which the legal services are being performed with regard to the duty of
confidentiality. If services are performed on behalf of a global organization, that
organization's property may be subject to judicial or administrative seizure in
numerous countries. Thus, a law firm must consider the risk, if any, to
confidential client information that would result if a disgruntled employee,
customer, or creditor of the vendor instituted a lawsuit and sought to seize the
organization's property within the jurisdiction (e.g., its papers and documents
containing confidential information). The disclosure of confidential client
information might also be an issue if a dispute arose between the law firm and
134

Determining the scope of a lawyer's duty of confidentiality under the shari'a is
not an easy task.
Although principles of the shari'a are largely consistent with U.S. standards
of confidentiality, various interpretations of Islamic law will determine the
acceptability of disclosure. In contrast to the maslaha mursalah concept,
other principles of the shari'a arguably demand that a lawyer abide by a
higher standard of duty in maintaining a client's confidentiality. In complex
representation involving Islamic issues, lawyers operating under the Model
Rules are charged with recognizing these higher standards. It is, therefore,
important for the lawyer dealing with Islamic issues to consult with the client
on the duty of confidentiality. Although difficult to imagine, a Muslim party
or client may expect a higher degree of confidentiality than a lawyer is
accustomed to.
M. McCary, Bridging Ethical Borders: International Legal Ethics with an Islamic
Perspective, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 289, 313 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
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E.g., NYSBA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 641 (1993) (analyzing a
lawyer's ethical responsibilities in complying with local recycling laws).
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vendor, and suit was brought in foreign jurisdiction where the work was
performed. 137 An evaluation of risk must also include an assessment of the
efficiency and honesty of the jurisdiction's court system, since in certain countries
the judiciary is notoriously slow and/or corrupt.
The duty to avoid conflicts of interest presents an even greater challenge
than the duty to protect confidential client information. While the admonition to
avoid conflicts of interest is a regular feature of codes of professional conduct in
both common and civil law countries, the interpretation of that admonition is far
from uniform.138 It is not at all unreasonable to assume that foreign lawyers and
organizations that employ foreign lawyers are generally insensitive to U.S.-style
conflicts. Consequently, a law firm must take painstaking care to communicate
the conflicts' standards that the foreign lawyer or
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This possibility has also been a matter of concern for state bar association ethics
committees with respect to the hiring of temporary lawyers from an agency. E.g., State Bar of
California Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1992-126 (1992).
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See Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of
Understanding the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign
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offshore organization must apply. 139 Bar association ethics committees have
created an extensive jurisprudence regarding the application of conflict of interest
ethics rules to affiliated lawyers and law firms. They have analyzed, for example,
conflicts avoidance by temporary lawyers 140 and lawyers in an “of counsel”
relationship. 141 That jurisprudence is a likely template for identifying the
conflicts dilemmas springing from the offshoring of legal services to foreign
lawyers. Finally, ethics opinions specifically discussing the relational boundaries
between U.S. and foreign lawyers should also generally contribute to shaping the
nature and extent of the U.S. lawyers’ involvement and supervision.142
The duty of competence requires a law firm to conduct two lines of
inquiry. The first is directed to answering the fundamental question, does the
foreign lawyer or offshore vendor possess the knowledge and skills necessary to
carry out the client's objective.143 The second is directed to an assessment of the
on-the-ground, day-in day-out, capability of the foreign lawyer or offshore vendor
139

Law firms have been disqualified for conflicts attributable to the experts they retained.
E.g., Schairer v. Schairer, 745 N.Y.S.2d 410 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002); see also Gibbs Properties Corp.
v. CIGNA Corp., 196 F.R.D. 430, 435-36 (M.D. Fl. 2000); Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 87
S.W.3d 139 (Tex. App. 2002); Western Digital Corp. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. Rptr.2d 179 (Cal
Ct. App. 1998). It is not at all inconceivable that a court might disqualify a law firm for a conflict
attributable to the foreign lawyers employed by an offshore vendor that the law firm hired or by
the simultaneous or successive work that the vendor was conducting for another law firm.
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to deliver the promised service. Neglecting either line of inquiry is fraught with
ethical and/or liability peril.
Issues of Tort Liability: The principles governing a lawyer's tort liability
for the actions of another lawyer to whom legal work has been outsourced have
become less certain in recent years. Traditionally, a law firm and its partners
were vicariously liable for the malpractice of the firm's lawyers and nonlawyer
employees. Consequently, if a partner "outsourced" an assignment for a client to
an associate or another partner in the firm, the law firm and all its partners bore
the risk that the associate or partner might negligently represent the client and
expose the firm and all its partners to financial ruin.144 See Case Studies ## 1-3,
supra.145 The physical location of the lawyer receiving the assignment (e.g., main
office, U.S. branch office, or foreign branch office) is irrelevant. The principle of
vicarious liability has weakened within the last twenty years, however, as the
legislatures and the courts have permitted lawyers to organize as professional
corporations, 146 limited liability partnerships, 147 and limited liability
corporations. 148 Nonetheless, it remains true as a general proposition that law
firms and their principals remain subject to vicarious liability for the actions of
their partners, 149 associates, 150 and nonlawyer employees 151 that damage their
clients. In some circumstances, they are liable for the acts of of-counsel
attorneys 152 and independent contractors who are performing non-delegable
duties. 153 Local counsel may also be liable to the client an out-of-state
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(N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1992); Staron v. Weinstein, 701 A.2d 1325 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
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Supp. 2005); Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, supra n. 146 at § 5.7, at 596-620 (2005 ed.).
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attorney.154 There is at least one case suggesting that an associate may be liable
to a supervising attorney for contribution arising out of the associate's negligence
and breech of contract.155
The doctrine of vicarious liability becomes more complicated if the
assignment is made to a lawyer who is not formally affiliated with the referring
law firm, such as in Case Studies ## 6-8, supra. In such instances, vicarious
liability may be grounded on the nondelegable character of the responsibility
being transferred to the receiving lawyer, the existence of a joint venture between
the two lawyers, or the referring lawyer's failure to exercise due care in selecting
the unaffiliated lawyer and/or in monitoring the lawyer's activities.
While state law defines the elements of a joint venture relationship,156 the
most important characteristic for the purposes of this article is an agreement to
share fees between the referring and receiving lawyer.157 In offshoring legal and
law-related services a law firm should consider how any financial arrangement
between the lawyer and the vendor may impact a later claim that the vendor was
not an independent contractor, but a joint venturer of the law firm, making the law
firm vicariously responsible for the vendor's negligence.
Tormo v. Yormark 158 is the touchstone for any discussion of vicarious
liability involving a lawyer's referral of a matter to an out-of-state lawyer and
consequently bears directly on a lawyer’s decision to offshore law-related or legal
services. In that case, a lawyer licensed to practice in New York referred a client
with a potential personal injury claim to a lawyer in New Jersey. The New York
lawyer did not research the New Jersey's lawyer's competence or reputation for
ethical behavior. He simply verified the lawyer's admission to the bar. Had he
conducted a more complete investigation, he might have learned that the New
Jersey lawyer had been indicted for conspiring fraudulently to obtain money from
an insurance company. The New Jersey lawyer ultimately embezzled the funds
received from the client's settlement of the personal injury claim. The client, in
turn, sued the New York lawyer seeking to hold the lawyer vicariously liable for
154
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the embezzlement.
The court's opinion in Tormo is important for two reasons. First, it
rejected on public policy grounds, the client's argument that the New York lawyer
had an independent obligation to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the
character of the New Jersey lawyer.159 Second, it concluded that the New York
lawyer could be held liable for the embezzlement if the lawyer failed to make
"such an inquiry as was required by ordinary prudence."160 The court denied the
New York lawyer's motion for summary judgment except for the investigation
claim because the pre-trial testimony of the lawyer, the client, and the client's
father raised genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether the
circumstances under which the referral was made triggered "such an inquiry as
was required by ordinary prudence."
Tormo thus stands for the proposition that a lawyer may have some duty of
inquiry before referring a client to another lawyer, especially one admitted in
another jurisdiction. 161 Its holding does not address the related question of the
referring lawyer's vicarious liability for the negligence of the lawyer receiving the
referral. The courts have almost uniformly rejected such a claim.162 The lesson to
be learned from Tormo is simple. In making the decision to offshore back office,
law-related, or legal services, a lawyer should make "such an inquiry as [is]
required by ordinary prudence." The scope of that inquiry should reflect the
sensitivity of the information and data being offshored. At a minimum, the
lawyer will have to interview the prospective contracting party's business
references thoroughly.
159

Id. at 1169-1171.
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Prudence may call for a more exhaustive investigation of the foreign
lawyer, law firm, or vendor that the lawyer is considering directly retaining or
recommending that the client retain, if trade secrets, confidential client
information, and work product are involved. In matters of extraordinary
sensitivity, it may be necessary to hire an outside investigator to evaluate the
prospective contracting party's professional integrity and competence.
IV: Conclusion: The Future of Outsourcing
Professional regulation does not prevent offshore outsourcing but
constrains it by requiring control and monitoring by U.S. lawyers. For GCs,
offshore outsourcing is in many respects simply more of the same: instead of
retaining their typical outside counsel for certain matters, they might outsource
through an outsourcing intermediary or directly to non-US lawyers working
offshore. But referring work to the corporation’s regular independent law firm
and outsourcing to a foreign vendor generates entirely different consequences for
the GC: the trust and confidence GCs typically place in the work of their outside
counsel will be replaced by the need to monitor and review the work of the
offshore outsourced worker. This monitoring function will reduce the cost
savings from offshore outsourcing as well as require GCs to accept a more active
and aggressive role. And while professional regulation requires monitoring in
terms of the content of the advice, GCs also will need to be mindful of the impact
of offshore outsourcing on their internal communication and control systems.163
The use of offshore outsourcing by corporate GCs adds a new element of
competition for their typical outside counsel that may especially impact law firms
that advise on more routine matters. In addition to outsourcing offshore, there is
competition from non-law firms that specialize in particular substantive areas and
whose staff may be comprised at least partly of lawyers, so that while the firm is
not technically offering legal advice, the services offered reduce the use of outside
counsel. 164 These firms serve as real competition for lawyers, especially the
midsize market, despite their being unable to market themselves as providing
legal services, as a result of the rejection and prohibition of multidisciplinary
forms of organizations for lawyers. 165 They operate as a sort of “stealth”
163
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multidisciplinary practice firm.
‘Sealth’ MDPs are non-law professional service firms that offer services
traditionally performed by lawyers through employees educated in the law.
These services include corporate investigations, where the identification of
material information is crucial, and tax advisory activities, where the clash
between the accountants and lawyers traditionally has been waged.
Entities offering business advice in other areas, such as mergers and
acquisitions, environmental matters, or human resources, also employ law
graduates and draw on their expertise.166
By sending work to non-US lawyers working offshore as well as to those working
in non-legal roles, corporate GCs avoid regulatory hurdles intended to protect the
public from unqualified advisors. Their hiring of these advisers, in spite of the
regulatory problems, indicates their lack of concern for protection.
For law firms considering whether to engage in offshore outsourcing
themselves, different issues are relevant. The risk for law firms is that the
outsourcing will tarnish their reputations. This is particularly serious because the
most efficient offshore outsourcing relationship will include only minimal time
spent on supervision and training of the outsourced lawyers, and this raises
concerns of quality control. In addition, outsourcing may hinder a firm’s ability
to provide sufficient training opportunities for its own new lawyers.
Law firms already employ significant numbers of lawyers who work
offshore, and in many offices and firms the vast majority of these are non-U.S.
lawyers.167 But firms expect their foreign office lawyers to work on transactions
at a similar level of sophistication to those performed by domestic lawyers in the
firm. This organizational framework is irrelevant for outsourcing if the purpose is
to lower legal fees.168
Firms could, however, revise their structures to accommodate a sort of inRule
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house outsourcing arrangement. One version might involve the organization of a
second law firm, related through training and referral agreements, for example,
which might function as a training firm for the primary firm in much the same
way that minor league baseball teams offer training for players hoping to shift to
the major league. The training firm would perform more routine services for
significantly lower costs than the primary firm, and the relationship between the
two might be analogous to that between a major league baseball team and its
training team.169 As lawyers in the training firm became more experienced, one
career trajectory would allow them access to the original, higher-end firm. Of
course, this sort of sister-firm structure could be accomplished domestically, and
it resembles the relationship described between certain of London’s Magic Circle
firms and provincial English firms to which they regularly refer routine matters.170
Whether offshore outsourcing will motivate law firms to reconsider their
relationships with firms occupying different tiers in the legal market remains to be
seen, but the attention devoted to offshore outsourcing in the legal and business
press indicates its perception as a threat to the status quo. The states’ rules of
professional conduct and principles of tort liability will not prevent offshore
outsourcing, although they may well render it less efficient. Rather, the
competition for role of corporate adviser will be settled by the rules of the
marketplace, including price, of course, but also quality and prestige.
In the realm of legal services, the importance of prestige and the
relationships that status may support and engender, as well as the role of judgment
and experience in the services offered, undermine to some extent the “flattening”
impact of outsourcing. While there is no doubt that offshore outsourcing creates
new opportunities for foreign lawyers, these opportunities do not put foreign
lawyers on an equal footing with U.S. lawyers. Rather, they enable foreign
lawyers to escape the strictures of their home legal professions. But there is an
enormous space between finding new opportunities in the home jurisdiction
market and gaining position in the U.S. market. Offshore outsourcing only
emphasizes these divisions, which are characteristic of globalization generally.
While we cannot predict the future, we see offshore outsourcing as one more
factor contributing to the existing divisions in the legal market while
simultaneously enabling shifting positions among the purchasers and sellers of
those services.
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